Security
- Check advanced_config permissions before creating a certificate on
host update (proxy, redirection and 404 hosts). A refused request
previously requested a Let's Encrypt certificate first, leaving an
orphan certificate and using up rate limit.
- Only trust X-NPM-Peer-Addr when it comes with a secret generated at
container start. The admin nginx sends both headers. Any proxy host or
stream forwarding to 127.0.0.1:3000 was also a loopback peer, so it
could forge the header and get a fresh rate-limit bucket on every
request. Without the secret (dev, or a mounted production.conf), the
header is ignored.
- Add a login limit per IP across all accounts (30 failed attempts a
minute) alongside the per-account one. Before this, one address could
spray passwords over any number of accounts. Behind a shared proxy,
everyone using that proxy shares this limit.
- Stop trusting X-Real-IP from loopback. It was only there for an older
version of the rate limiter, and it let a stream host forwarding to a
local proxy host forge the client IP and get past IP access lists.
Loopback now behaves as it does on master.
Correctness
- Refuse to delete a certificate that hosts still use (400, with counts
per host type). Their configs include its files, and a successful
revoke deleted them anyway, which broke nginx -t. Otherwise the
certificate is revoked and its files are removed even if the revoke
fails.
- Let non-admins clear a location's advanced config. Deleting the
location was already allowed and has the same effect, and a location
deleted and re-added at the same path arrives with an empty config,
which was refused.
- Clear proxy host grants (meta.proxy_host_ids) when visibility isn't
"user" or proxy hosts are hidden, and drop ids of deleted hosts.
Before, hidden grants came back when proxy hosts were shown again.
The backend enforces this; the permissions modal also stops sending
them.
- 404 host and redirection host modals now wait for the current user
to load, so an admin's advanced config change isn't dropped if they
submit before it loads.
Tests
- NonAdminHosts.cy.js: refused change doesn't create a certificate,
location rename and clear rules, grant clearing.
- Certificates.cy.js: deleting a certificate that is in use.
Security
- Redact certbot output before it reaches the API: strip the
certificate's DNS credential values, URL query strings and userinfo,
secret-looking key=value pairs and Bearer/Basic tokens. DNS plugins
can echo request URLs carrying API keys. The raw CommandError is no
longer attached as `previous`, since the error handler returns
`previous` to the client on certificate routes.
- Rate limit login/2FA on the admin nginx's real TCP peer, passed as
X-NPM-Peer-Addr ($realip_remote_addr), instead of X-Forwarded-For.
nginx trusts X-Real-IP from private ranges, so a client on the LAN or
Docker network could get a fresh bucket on every request. Behind
another proxy, limits now apply per account through that proxy.
- Bound rate limiter memory: hash keys over 128 chars and cap each store
at 50k entries, removing expired entries first and then the oldest.
Correctness
- Proxy host modal: send location advanced configs unchanged for
non-admins instead of looking them up by path, which dropped the
config from a renamed location.
- Location advanced config: locations that omit advanced_config now get
a config only after explicit ones are matched, so a new location at
an old path can't take the config from the renamed location.
- Certificate upload: check that the certificate matches the private
key (uploaded or stored) before writing, so a mismatched pair can't
break nginx -t.
- Certificate delete: keep the Let's Encrypt files when revoke fails and
hosts still use the certificate, so their configs still load.
Cleanup
- Make the rate-limit certbot hint first in the list, as its comment
says.
- Proxy host getCount uses the permissions access has already loaded
instead of querying user_permission again.
- Rate limiter: register the success refund listener in one place and
call it a fixed window, not a sliding one.
($http_host) forwards the raw client Host header, including the port and
any absolute-form URI mismatch, to every upstream and into the asset
cache key
When /run/nginx is already owned by PUID:PGID, the ownership step skips
it, so a leftover nginx.pid owned by root stays in place and nginx,
running as PUID:PGID, fails with "Permission denied" on every start.
Nginx is not running yet during prepare, so remove the pid file there.
Fixes#5964
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Keep the incoming Host authority for default and custom locations, with the existing hostname fallback when Host is absent. Add a built-image regression that validates Host against Origin and Referer and run it after the CI image build.
Some paths rendered host configs without fully loading the relations
the templates depend on, silently dropping access rules (and SSL):
- Enabling a proxy host loaded the access list without its clients or
auth items, so the host came back with no access restrictions.
- Requesting a Let's Encrypt certificate re-rendered every host sharing
its domains from bare rows, dropping access rules and SSL.
generateConfig now loads any referenced certificate or access list that
isn't fully loaded, so no caller can render a partial config. The two
callers above also fetch the relations themselves, and a warning is
logged when a host's access list is missing or has no rules.
Adds integration tests covering access lists across disable/enable.
Fixes#5919, #4286, #5710
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nginx Proxy Manager had no way to inspect application or nginx logs
from the web UI - admins had to shell into the container or read
`docker logs`. This adds an admin-only Logs page that can tail:
- the backend application log, now also mirrored to
/data/logs/backend.log (in addition to stdout) and rotated by the
logrotate timer that already runs every 2 days
- the Let's Encrypt/certbot log, which certbot already writes to
/data/logs/letsencrypt.log via its existing --logs-dir flag
- per-host nginx access/error logs (proxy, redirection, 404 and
stream hosts), with the file path always resolved server-side from
a validated host_type enum + numeric host_id, never from client
input
Reads use a reverse chunked scan (64KB chunks, capped at 5MB scanned
per request) instead of loading whole files into memory, and the
frontend polls every 5s only while the tab is focused and "Live" is
on, so this stays cheap on both CPU and memory. No new runtime
dependencies were added on either side.
Purely additive: two new admin-only endpoints
(GET /api/logs/sources, GET /api/logs/tail), no existing behaviour
changed.
- Adds request logging in debug mode for some endpoints
- Moves certbot version determination to the startup scripts and removes
bash script encapsulation when installing plugins
- Revert loose domain validation, which was there for a specific reason
addressing CVE's
- Fix Cypress suite for cert generation
- Adds Cypress test that iterates over the entire certbot plugins list
and installs each one, ensuring at the very least that the install
works
- Fixed some plugins based on this
- (!) Still some work to do on this, hostinger is still broken at least
- Improved cypress tests for custom certs; they will generate on each
run instead of being baked in. The baked ones were due to expire soon
Replace unsafe `echo "$(sed ...)" > $FILE` with atomic temp-file write.
The current pattern reads a file with sed inside a command substitution,
then writes the result back via echo redirection. If sed reads an empty
or momentarily unreadable file (e.g., NFS transient issue during
container recreation by Watchtower or similar tools), it produces no
output. The echo then writes exactly 1 byte (a newline) to the config
file, silently destroying its contents.
The fix writes sed output to a temp file first, checks it's non-empty
with `[ -s ]`, then atomically replaces the original via `mv`. If sed
produces empty output, the original file is preserved and a warning is
logged to stderr.
When Nginx is behind another proxy server (like CloudFlare or AWS ALB), the force-SSL
feature can cause redirect loops because Nginx sees the connection as plain HTTP
while SSL is already handled upstream. This adds a new boolean option to trust
the X-Forwarded-Proto header from upstream proxies.
Changes:
- Add `trust_forwarded_proto` column to proxy_host table (migration)
- Update model and API schema to support the new boolean field
- Modify force-ssl Nginx template to check X-Forwarded-Proto/X-Forwarded-Scheme
- Add map directives in nginx.conf to validate and sanitize forwarded headers
- Add advanced option toggle in frontend UI with i18n support (EN/ZH)
- Set proxy headers from validated map variables instead of $scheme
This allows administrators to control SSL redirect behavior when Nginx is deployed
behind a TLS-terminating proxy.
- Don't touch a file to determine if we need to run
- Instead, check ownership of each location and skip it if we are happy
- Keeping SKIP_CERTBOT_OWNERSHIP flag
- More vebose logging of outcomes
Jamie Curnow
mikeyheneinandClaude Opus 5.5
Askhat AkhtanovandClaude Opus 5.5
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xJayMorex
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Tony Chau
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