Security
- Check advanced_config permissions before creating a certificate on
host update (proxy, redirection and 404 hosts). A refused request
previously requested a Let's Encrypt certificate first, leaving an
orphan certificate and using up rate limit.
- Only trust X-NPM-Peer-Addr when it comes with a secret generated at
container start. The admin nginx sends both headers. Any proxy host or
stream forwarding to 127.0.0.1:3000 was also a loopback peer, so it
could forge the header and get a fresh rate-limit bucket on every
request. Without the secret (dev, or a mounted production.conf), the
header is ignored.
- Add a login limit per IP across all accounts (30 failed attempts a
minute) alongside the per-account one. Before this, one address could
spray passwords over any number of accounts. Behind a shared proxy,
everyone using that proxy shares this limit.
- Stop trusting X-Real-IP from loopback. It was only there for an older
version of the rate limiter, and it let a stream host forwarding to a
local proxy host forge the client IP and get past IP access lists.
Loopback now behaves as it does on master.
Correctness
- Refuse to delete a certificate that hosts still use (400, with counts
per host type). Their configs include its files, and a successful
revoke deleted them anyway, which broke nginx -t. Otherwise the
certificate is revoked and its files are removed even if the revoke
fails.
- Let non-admins clear a location's advanced config. Deleting the
location was already allowed and has the same effect, and a location
deleted and re-added at the same path arrives with an empty config,
which was refused.
- Clear proxy host grants (meta.proxy_host_ids) when visibility isn't
"user" or proxy hosts are hidden, and drop ids of deleted hosts.
Before, hidden grants came back when proxy hosts were shown again.
The backend enforces this; the permissions modal also stops sending
them.
- 404 host and redirection host modals now wait for the current user
to load, so an admin's advanced config change isn't dropped if they
submit before it loads.
Tests
- NonAdminHosts.cy.js: refused change doesn't create a certificate,
location rename and clear rules, grant clearing.
- Certificates.cy.js: deleting a certificate that is in use.
- Add in-memory sliding window rate limiter for auth token endpoints with CI/test bypass and successful request exclusion
- Add user_permission meta column migration and Objection model configuration
- Support scoping allowed proxy hosts per user when in 'Created Items Only' visibility mode
- Restrict advanced nginx configuration editing on hosts to admin users only
- Fix user permissions route ID parsing and omit id from permission update payloads
- Add allowed proxy hosts selector in permissions modal and display permissions summary badges in users table
Nginx Proxy Manager had no way to inspect application or nginx logs
from the web UI - admins had to shell into the container or read
`docker logs`. This adds an admin-only Logs page that can tail:
- the backend application log, now also mirrored to
/data/logs/backend.log (in addition to stdout) and rotated by the
logrotate timer that already runs every 2 days
- the Let's Encrypt/certbot log, which certbot already writes to
/data/logs/letsencrypt.log via its existing --logs-dir flag
- per-host nginx access/error logs (proxy, redirection, 404 and
stream hosts), with the file path always resolved server-side from
a validated host_type enum + numeric host_id, never from client
input
Reads use a reverse chunked scan (64KB chunks, capped at 5MB scanned
per request) instead of loading whole files into memory, and the
frontend polls every 5s only while the tab is focused and "Live" is
on, so this stays cheap on both CPU and memory. No new runtime
dependencies were added on either side.
Purely additive: two new admin-only endpoints
(GET /api/logs/sources, GET /api/logs/tail), no existing behaviour
changed.
When Nginx is behind another proxy server (like CloudFlare or AWS ALB), the force-SSL
feature can cause redirect loops because Nginx sees the connection as plain HTTP
while SSL is already handled upstream. This adds a new boolean option to trust
the X-Forwarded-Proto header from upstream proxies.
Changes:
- Add `trust_forwarded_proto` column to proxy_host table (migration)
- Update model and API schema to support the new boolean field
- Modify force-ssl Nginx template to check X-Forwarded-Proto/X-Forwarded-Scheme
- Add map directives in nginx.conf to validate and sanitize forwarded headers
- Add advanced option toggle in frontend UI with i18n support (EN/ZH)
- Set proxy headers from validated map variables instead of $scheme
This allows administrators to control SSL redirect behavior when Nginx is deployed
behind a TLS-terminating proxy.
- Added frontend translation for english
- Moved frontend api logic to hook and backend api space
- Added swagger schema for the new api endpoint
- Moved backend logic to its own internal file
- Added user agent header to github api check
- Added cypress integration test for version check api
- Added a memory cache item from github check to avoid hitting it too
much
- /schema now returns full openapi/swagger schema
- That schema is used to validate incoming requests
- And used as a contract in future integration tests
- Moved route files up one level
- Fixed incorrect 404 reponses when getting objects
- Fixed saving new objects and passing jsonschemavalidation
Jamie Curnow
Abdulhafiz Davlatov
carlosalbertorg
jerry-yuan
Sander Jochems
Chris Maffey