Nginx Proxy Manager had no way to inspect application or nginx logs
from the web UI - admins had to shell into the container or read
`docker logs`. This adds an admin-only Logs page that can tail:
- the backend application log, now also mirrored to
/data/logs/backend.log (in addition to stdout) and rotated by the
logrotate timer that already runs every 2 days
- the Let's Encrypt/certbot log, which certbot already writes to
/data/logs/letsencrypt.log via its existing --logs-dir flag
- per-host nginx access/error logs (proxy, redirection, 404 and
stream hosts), with the file path always resolved server-side from
a validated host_type enum + numeric host_id, never from client
input
Reads use a reverse chunked scan (64KB chunks, capped at 5MB scanned
per request) instead of loading whole files into memory, and the
frontend polls every 5s only while the tab is focused and "Live" is
on, so this stays cheap on both CPU and memory. No new runtime
dependencies were added on either side.
Purely additive: two new admin-only endpoints
(GET /api/logs/sources, GET /api/logs/tail), no existing behaviour
changed.
Your CI caught this: the check passed on SQLite and never fired on the
stack where the database container runs on a different timezone from the
app, so a stale token stayed valid. The comparison was between a token's
`iat`, which is UTC seconds from Node, and `auth.modified_on`, which the
driver hands back interpreted in the app's timezone. With the app on
Australia/Brisbane and the database on UTC, that column comes back ten
hours in the past and the token always looks newer than the change.
Record the moment in `auth.meta.password_changed_at` instead, written by
`setPassword` with the same `Date.now()` clock that mints `iat`. Same
unit on both sides, one clock, and no timestamp parsing: the Date and
local-string branch is gone, and so is the whole-second flooring that
Postgres microseconds made necessary.
Rows written before this have no marker and revoke nothing until their
next password change, which is the safe direction to be wrong in.
Tokens are stateless JWTs, so changing a password left every session that
the old one had opened working until its own expiry, up to a day later.
That is the case the password change is meant to close: an administrator
resetting a compromised account did not evict whoever was already in it.
The auth row already records when the password last changed, so no
migration is needed: `Access.init()` reads it alongside the user it
already loads and refuses a token whose `iat` is older. Both sides are
compared as whole seconds, which is all `iat` carries, so a token minted
in the same second as the change is kept. Postgres stores that column to
the microsecond, which is why the comparison is not done in milliseconds.
It is reported as 401 rather than the usual 403 because that is what the
frontend clears the session on, so the browser holding the dead token
lands on the login page instead of a page full of errors, and `can()`
lets that one error through unwrapped for the same reason.
Only the password does this. A user row changing (a rename, an avatar,
permissions) does not, and a user with no password auth row, which is
what a login through an external provider looks like, is not affected.
The catch block in `access.can()` constructed `errs.PermissionError`
without `new`. The error constructors in `backend/lib/error.js` are plain
constructor functions that assign to `this` and return nothing, so calling
one without `new` evaluates to `undefined`.
The statement therefore did `throw undefined`, the express error handler
in `backend/app.js` received undefined (and could not read `.status` or
`.public` off it), and the request fell through to the catch-all 404
handler in `backend/routes/main.js`.
Net effect: every authorization failure raised by `access.can(...)` was
reported to clients as `404 Not Found` instead of `403 Forbidden`.
Line 45 of the same file already used `new` correctly, which shows this
was an oversight rather than deliberate resource-existence hiding. A grep
over `backend/` confirms this was the only error constructor invoked
without `new`.
- Adds request logging in debug mode for some endpoints
- Moves certbot version determination to the startup scripts and removes
bash script encapsulation when installing plugins
- Revert loose domain validation, which was there for a specific reason
addressing CVE's
- Fix Cypress suite for cert generation
- Adds Cypress test that iterates over the entire certbot plugins list
and installs each one, ensuring at the very least that the install
works
- Fixed some plugins based on this
- (!) Still some work to do on this, hostinger is still broken at least
- Improved cypress tests for custom certs; they will generate on each
run instead of being baked in. The baked ones were due to expire soon
this is required for test suite to use dns certbot request
without talking to live or staging letsencrypt servers or
production level dns providers. This is a backwards port
from the v3 branch and opens the door for a full certificate
cypress test
- /schema now returns full openapi/swagger schema
- That schema is used to validate incoming requests
- And used as a contract in future integration tests
- Moved route files up one level
- Fixed incorrect 404 reponses when getting objects
- Fixed saving new objects and passing jsonschemavalidation
- Added a script to install every single plugin, used in development and debugging
- Improved certbot plugin install commands
- Adjusted some version for plugins to install properly
- It's noted that some plugins require deps that do not match other plugins,
however these use cases should be extremely rare
- No longer use config npm package
- Prefer config from env vars, though still has support for config file
- No longer writes a config file for database config
- Writes keys to a new file in /data folder
- Removes a lot of cruft and improves config understanding
Jamie Curnow
carlosalbertorg
José M. Requena Plens
vgoer
Timothé Stoifl
Timothé Stoifl
Markus
12LuA
Jonathon Aroutsidis
Nico Lynzaad
An Seongjin