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Fix second round of review findings from PR #6029
Security - Check advanced_config permissions before creating a certificate on host update (proxy, redirection and 404 hosts). A refused request previously requested a Let's Encrypt certificate first, leaving an orphan certificate and using up rate limit. - Only trust X-NPM-Peer-Addr when it comes with a secret generated at container start. The admin nginx sends both headers. Any proxy host or stream forwarding to 127.0.0.1:3000 was also a loopback peer, so it could forge the header and get a fresh rate-limit bucket on every request. Without the secret (dev, or a mounted production.conf), the header is ignored. - Add a login limit per IP across all accounts (30 failed attempts a minute) alongside the per-account one. Before this, one address could spray passwords over any number of accounts. Behind a shared proxy, everyone using that proxy shares this limit. - Stop trusting X-Real-IP from loopback. It was only there for an older version of the rate limiter, and it let a stream host forwarding to a local proxy host forge the client IP and get past IP access lists. Loopback now behaves as it does on master. Correctness - Refuse to delete a certificate that hosts still use (400, with counts per host type). Their configs include its files, and a successful revoke deleted them anyway, which broke nginx -t. Otherwise the certificate is revoked and its files are removed even if the revoke fails. - Let non-admins clear a location's advanced config. Deleting the location was already allowed and has the same effect, and a location deleted and re-added at the same path arrives with an empty config, which was refused. - Clear proxy host grants (meta.proxy_host_ids) when visibility isn't "user" or proxy hosts are hidden, and drop ids of deleted hosts. Before, hidden grants came back when proxy hosts were shown again. The backend enforces this; the permissions modal also stops sending them. - 404 host and redirection host modals now wait for the current user to load, so an admin's advanced config change isn't dropped if they submit before it loads. Tests - NonAdminHosts.cy.js: refused change doesn't create a certificate, location rename and clear rules, grant clearing. - Certificates.cy.js: deleting a certificate that is in use.
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@@ -566,7 +566,24 @@ const internalCertificate = {
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throw new error.ItemNotFoundError(data.id);
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}
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const inUse = hostRelations.some((rel) => row[rel]?.length);
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// A certificate that hosts still use can't be deleted: their rendered configs include its
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// files, and revoking it would leave them serving a revoked certificate. Hosts may belong
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// to other users, so only counts are reported.
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const labels = {
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proxy_hosts: "proxy host",
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redirection_hosts: "redirection host",
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dead_hosts: "404 host",
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streams: "stream",
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};
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const usage = hostRelations
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.map((rel) => ({ rel, count: row[rel]?.length || 0 }))
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.filter((u) => u.count > 0)
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.map((u) => `${u.count} ${labels[u.rel]}${u.count === 1 ? "" : "s"}`);
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if (usage.length) {
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throw new error.ValidationError(
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`Certificate is in use by ${usage.join(", ")}. Remove it from them before deleting it.`,
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);
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}
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for (const rel of hostRelations) {
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delete row[rel];
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}
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@@ -586,20 +603,10 @@ const internalCertificate = {
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});
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if (row.provider === "letsencrypt") {
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// Revoke the cert
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const revoked = await internalCertificate.revokeLetsEncryptSsl(row, true).then(
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() => true,
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() => false,
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);
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// Certbot leaves the files behind when it can't revoke (e.g. a broken renewal config).
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// Remove them anyway, unless a host still uses this certificate: its rendered config
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// includes these files, and removing them would fail nginx -t on the next reload.
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if (!revoked && inUse) {
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logger.warn(
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`Certificate #${row.id} was deleted but could not be revoked, and hosts still use it; its files in /etc/letsencrypt were kept`,
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);
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return true;
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}
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// Revoke the cert. Errors are logged by revokeLetsEncryptSsl.
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await internalCertificate.revokeLetsEncryptSsl(row);
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// Certbot leaves the files behind when it can't revoke (e.g. a broken renewal config),
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// so remove them either way. No host uses them; that was checked above.
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// The row is already deleted and audited, so leftover files are logged, not thrown:
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// an error here would report a completed delete as failed, and a retry would 404.
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const leftover = internalCertificate.removeLetsEncryptFiles(row.id);
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@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ const internalDeadHost = {
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);
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}
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// Before the certificate is created, so a refused request doesn't leave one behind
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internalHost.assertAdvancedConfigAllowed(access, data, row);
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if (createCertificate) {
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const cert = await internalCertificate.createQuickCertificate(access, {
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domain_names: data.domain_names || row.domain_names,
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@@ -153,8 +156,6 @@ const internalDeadHost = {
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thisData = internalHost.cleanSslHstsData(thisData, row);
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internalHost.assertAdvancedConfigAllowed(access, data, row);
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// do the row update
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await deadHostModel.query().where({ id: data.id }).patch(data);
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@@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ const internalHost = {
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},
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/**
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* For non-admins: every location's advanced_config must be one that already exists on this
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* host. Matching is by value, not path, so renaming or reordering a location that carries
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* admin-written config is allowed, but new or edited config is not. Each existing config can
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* be used once (no duplicating it onto other paths), and same-path matches are taken first.
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* For non-admins: every location's advanced_config must be empty or one that already exists
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* on this host. Matching is by value, not path, so renaming or reordering a location that
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* carries admin-written config is allowed, but new or edited config is not. Each existing
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* config can be used once (no duplicating it onto other paths), and same-path matches are
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* taken first. Clearing a config is allowed: deleting the location is, and has the same
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* effect, and a location deleted and re-added at the same path arrives with an empty config.
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* A location that omits advanced_config keeps the one at its path, unless another location
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* explicitly carries it. Mutates `locations`.
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*
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@@ -86,10 +88,10 @@ const internalHost = {
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}
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}
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// Pass 2: renamed/moved locations may carry an existing config not already claimed.
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// Clearing a config is not allowed, as before.
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// Pass 2: renamed/moved locations may carry an existing config not already claimed, or
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// none at all
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for (const loc of unresolved) {
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if (!loc.advanced_config || !take(loc.advanced_config)) {
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if (loc.advanced_config && !take(loc.advanced_config)) {
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deny();
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}
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}
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@@ -157,6 +157,9 @@ const internalProxyHost = {
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);
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}
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// Before the certificate is created, so a refused request doesn't leave one behind
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internalHost.assertAdvancedConfigAllowed(access, thisData, row);
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if (createCertificate) {
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return internalCertificate
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.createQuickCertificate(access, {
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@@ -185,8 +188,6 @@ const internalProxyHost = {
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thisData = internalHost.cleanSslHstsData(thisData, row);
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internalHost.assertAdvancedConfigAllowed(access, thisData, row);
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return proxyHostModel
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.query()
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.where({ id: thisData.id })
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@@ -157,6 +157,9 @@ const internalRedirectionHost = {
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);
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}
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// Before the certificate is created, so a refused request doesn't leave one behind
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internalHost.assertAdvancedConfigAllowed(access, thisData, row);
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if (createCertificate) {
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return internalCertificate
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.createQuickCertificate(access, {
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@@ -185,8 +188,6 @@ const internalRedirectionHost = {
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thisData = internalHost.cleanSslHstsData(thisData, row);
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internalHost.assertAdvancedConfigAllowed(access, thisData, row);
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return redirectionHostModel
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.query()
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.where({ id: thisData.id })
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import _ from "lodash";
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import errs from "../lib/error.js";
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import utils from "../lib/utils.js";
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import authModel from "../models/auth.js";
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import proxyHostModel from "../models/proxy_host.js";
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import userModel from "../models/user.js";
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import userPermissionModel from "../models/user_permission.js";
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import internalAuditLog from "./audit-log.js";
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@@ -460,7 +461,8 @@ const internalUser = {
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.query()
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.where("user_id", user.id)
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.first()
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.then((existing_auth) => {
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.then(async (existing_auth) => {
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permData.meta = await internalUser.normalisePermissionMeta(existing_auth, permData);
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if (existing_auth) {
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// patch
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return userPermissionModel
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@@ -489,6 +491,36 @@ const internalUser = {
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});
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},
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/**
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* The permission meta to store. Proxy host grants (meta.proxy_host_ids) only apply while
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* visibility is "user" and proxy hosts are not hidden, so they're cleared otherwise; kept,
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* they would silently come back when proxy hosts are shown again. Ids of hosts that no
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* longer exist are dropped. `permData` may be partial, so the stored values fill the gaps.
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*
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* @param {Object} [existing] the stored user_permission row
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* @param {Object} permData incoming permission fields
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* @returns {Promise<Object>}
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*/
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normalisePermissionMeta: async (existing, permData) => {
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const effective = _.assign(
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{ visibility: "user", proxy_hosts: "hidden" },
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existing || {},
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_.omit(permData, ["meta"]),
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);
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const meta = _.assign({}, existing?.meta || {}, permData.meta || {});
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const requested = Array.isArray(meta.proxy_host_ids) ? _.uniq(meta.proxy_host_ids) : [];
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if (effective.visibility !== "user" || effective.proxy_hosts === "hidden" || !requested.length) {
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meta.proxy_host_ids = [];
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return meta;
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}
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const rows = await proxyHostModel.query().select("id").where("is_deleted", 0).whereIn("id", requested);
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const found = new Set(rows.map((r) => r.id));
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meta.proxy_host_ids = requested.filter((id) => found.has(id));
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return meta;
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},
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/**
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* @param {Access} access
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* @param {Object} data
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@@ -28,21 +28,37 @@ const cleanupTimer = setInterval(() => {
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}, 120000);
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cleanupTimer.unref();
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// Generated at container start (prepare/45-admin-port.sh) and sent by the admin nginx as
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// X-NPM-Peer-Secret alongside X-NPM-Peer-Addr. Unset (development, or a mounted production.conf)
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// means the header is never trusted.
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const peerSecret = Buffer.from(process.env.NPM_PEER_SECRET || "");
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const hasPeerSecret = (value) => {
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if (!peerSecret.length || typeof value !== "string") {
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return false;
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}
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const given = Buffer.from(value);
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return given.length === peerSecret.length && crypto.timingSafeEqual(given, peerSecret);
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};
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/**
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* The address to rate limit on: the TCP peer of the admin nginx, which it passes as
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* X-NPM-Peer-Addr ($realip_remote_addr), only honoured when the socket is loopback (that nginx,
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* in this container). The realip-resolved client address is deliberately not used: nginx trusts
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* X-Real-IP from private ranges, so a client on the LAN or Docker network could pick a new
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* address, and a fresh bucket, on every request. Behind another proxy this resolves to that
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* proxy's address, which is why limiters also key on the target account.
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* X-NPM-Peer-Addr ($realip_remote_addr). That header is only honoured from a loopback socket
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* carrying the startup secret, so it can only have come from the admin nginx: a proxy host or
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* stream forwarding to the backend port is also a loopback peer, but can't know the secret.
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* The realip-resolved client address is deliberately not used: nginx trusts X-Real-IP from
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* private ranges, so a client on the LAN or Docker network could pick a new address, and a fresh
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* bucket, on every request. Behind another proxy (including an NPM proxy host in front of the
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* admin UI) this resolves to that proxy's address.
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*
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* @param {Object} req
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* @returns {String}
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*/
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export const getClientIp = (req) => {
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const socketAddr = req.socket?.remoteAddress || "unknown";
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const isTrustedLocalProxy = socketAddr === "127.0.0.1" || socketAddr === "::1" || socketAddr === "::ffff:127.0.0.1";
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const peerAddr = isTrustedLocalProxy ? req.headers["x-npm-peer-addr"]?.trim() : null;
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const isLoopback = socketAddr === "127.0.0.1" || socketAddr === "::1" || socketAddr === "::ffff:127.0.0.1";
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const trusted = isLoopback && hasPeerSecret(req.headers["x-npm-peer-secret"]);
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const peerAddr = trusted ? req.headers["x-npm-peer-addr"]?.trim() : null;
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return peerAddr || socketAddr;
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};
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@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@ import apiValidator from "../lib/validator/api.js";
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import { debug, express as logger } from "../logger.js";
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import { getValidationSchema } from "../schema/index.js";
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// Keyed on IP + target account rather than IP alone: when the admin UI sits behind another
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// proxy every client can resolve to the same IP, and an IP-only bucket would let anyone lock
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// out every user with a handful of bad logins. Brute force against one account is still
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// capped per connecting address (see getClientIp).
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// Two limits apply to logins. Per IP + target account: when the admin UI sits behind another
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// proxy every client can resolve to the same IP, and an IP-only bucket at this size would let
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// anyone lock out every user with a handful of bad logins.
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const tokenRateLimiter = createRateLimiter({
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windowMs: 60 * 1000,
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max: 10,
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@@ -21,6 +20,16 @@ const tokenRateLimiter = createRateLimiter({
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},
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});
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// And per IP across all accounts, so one address can't spray passwords over many accounts at
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// 10 a minute each. Only failures count. Behind a shared proxy this cap is shared by everyone
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// using it, which is why it's higher than the per-account one.
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const tokenIpRateLimiter = createRateLimiter({
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windowMs: 60 * 1000,
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max: 30,
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message: "Too many login attempts. Please try again in 1 minute.",
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skipSuccessfulRequests: true,
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});
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// Keyed on the user the challenge belongs to, not the challenge token itself, so fetching
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// fresh challenge tokens doesn't reset the code-guessing budget. The payload is read without
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// verifying the signature; verify2FA does that. A forged token only affects buckets for the
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@@ -79,7 +88,7 @@ router
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*
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* Create a new Token
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*/
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.post(tokenRateLimiter, async (req, res, next) => {
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.post(tokenIpRateLimiter, tokenRateLimiter, async (req, res, next) => {
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try {
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const data = await apiValidator(getValidationSchema("/tokens", "post"), req.body);
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const result = await internalToken.getTokenFromEmail(data);
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@@ -35,6 +35,26 @@
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}
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}
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}
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},
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"400": {
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"description": "400 response",
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"content": {
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"application/json": {
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"examples": {
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"default": {
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"value": {
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"error": {
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"code": 400,
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"message": "Certificate is in use by 1 proxy host. Remove it from them before deleting it."
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}
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}
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}
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},
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"schema": {
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"$ref": "../../../../components/error.json"
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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